Historical Document · 2002
The UN Panel of Experts' report on Liberia, transmitted to the Security Council on 25 October 2002. The Škorpion vz. 61 dive cites paragraphs 64–65 and Table 1, a consignment flown from Belgrade to Liberia that included 60 Yugoslav M84 machine pistols in 7.65 mm (the licensed Škorpion).
S/2002/1115 United Nations Security Council Distr.: General 25 October 2002 Original: English Letter dated 24 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia and in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1408 (2002), I have the honour to submit the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (see annex). In this connection, I would appreciate it if the present letter together with its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Kishore Mahbubani Chairman Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia 02-62679 (E) 281002 *0262679* S/2002/1115 Annex Letter dated 7 October 2002 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia to the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia We have the honour to enclose the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, in accordance with paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1408 (2002). (Signed) Atabou Bodian (Signed) Johan Peleman (Signed) Harjit Sandhu (Signed) Alex Vines 2 S/2002/1115 Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia Contents Paragraphs Page Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–22 7 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–43 10 A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–31 10 B. Methodology of the investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32–37 12 C. Standards of verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38–40 12 D. Mandate of the Panel: the dilemma continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 13 E. De-linking subparagraph 2 (a) to (d) from paragraphs 5 to 7 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42–43 13 Liberia’s internal conflict and regional instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44–58 14 A. Remnants of the Revolutionary United Front are still active in Liberia . . . . . . 51–54 15 B. Fears of the civilian population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–57 16 C. Intimidation of sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 16 59–90 16 Part One The context Part Two Weapons I. Continued violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Use of ships in the transportation of arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 16 B. Air transportation is the preference of sanctions busters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 17 C. Deceptive practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61–63 17 D. Arms cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64–90 18 II. Arms for Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91–95 23 III. Humanitarian impact and the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96–99 25 IV. Recommendations on arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100–108 25 Part Three Civil aviation I. On the new registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 26 II. Management of airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 26 3 S/2002/1115 III. Crash of the Antonov 12 on 15 February 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111–121 27 IV. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122–123 29 Part Four Diamonds I. Diamond embargo on Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124–129 29 II. Smuggling continues to neighbouring States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130–133 30 III. Diamonds used as a cover for illicit imports of weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134–137 31 IV. Humanitarian impact of the diamond embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138–143 32 V. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144–156 32 A. Sierra Leone and Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146–149 33 B. The Gambia and the Kimberley Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150–151 33 C. Liberia 152–156 34 157 35 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158–173 35 A. Humanitarian impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162–171 36 B. Coping mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172–173 38 Maritime and corporate registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174–183 38 Auditing maritime revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184–188 40 Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189–192 40 Auditing timber and other revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193–194 41 Conclusion and recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195–196 42 VI. Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part Five Revenue and governmental expenditure I. II. III. IV. Part Six Travel ban I. The travel ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197–200 42 II. Humanitarian impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201–204 43 I. Letter of appointment of the Panel of Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 II. Meetings and consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 III. Double document trail: an example of different flight requests for the same aircraft for 27 and 28 June, one showing Lagos as the destination, the other showing the real destination, Roberts International Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Double document trail: cargo manifest for one of the arms flights, stamped in Lagos by the fictitious company Aruna Import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Annexes IV.A. 4 S/2002/1115 IV.B. Double document trail: fuel bill that the Panel received from the crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 V. Forged copy of a letter, allegedly from the Ministry of Defence of Nigeria, authenticating that Nigeria is the end-user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Copy of an Ivorian end-user certificate with the list of weapons identical to the one used by Leonid Minin and Aviatrend for shipments to Liberia in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Terms of reference for the management audit and systems design of maritime and forestry revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 VI. VII. 5 S/2002/1115 Abbreviations 6 AFL Armed Forces of Liberia ASECNA Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar ATU Anti-Terrorist Unit (Liberia) ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FOB Freight on board HRD Hoge Raad voor Diamnant/High Diamond Council ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IMO International Maritime Organization Interpol International Criminal Police Organization LISCR Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy MSF Médecins sans frontières OTC Oriental Timber Company (Liberia) PCASED Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development RIA Roberts International Airport RPG Rocket propelled grenade RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) RUFP RUF Party ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOL United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia UNREC United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa USAID United States Agency for International Development WHO World Health Organization S/2002/1115 Executive summary 1. Since the Panel submitted its last report (S/2002/470) in April 2002, Liberia’s internal conflict has continued to spread, with violence spilling over into Guinea and Sierra Leone. Recent events in Côte d’Ivoire also underscore how fragile this region remains, although the peaceful multiparty elections in Sierra Leone in May were a positive development. 2. The Panel continued to track the remnants of the armed RUF. It met with Ibrahim Balde (also known as Bah) and the wife of Sam “Mosquito” Bockarie, as part of its efforts to assess the continued capability of these remnants of RUF in Liberia. The Panel was unable to locate “Mosquito” but continues to believe that he is currently resident outside Liberia, possibly in Ghana. 3. Balde and another informed source in Monrovia estimated that RUF strength in Liberia is between 1,250 and 1,500 men, operating in elite Liberian government military units. These men represent the last coherent surviving structure of the armed RUF. They enjoy the patronage of the Liberian Government and continue to play an important part in Liberia’s military capability. Arms 4. The Panel uncovered new violations of the arms embargo on Liberia, including the delivery to Roberts International Airport of six cargo aircraft in June, July and August 2002 containing weapons and ammunition supplies totalling over 200 tons. These weapons were mainly from old Yugoslav stocks and were supplied by an arms dealer based in Belgrade. 5. To avoid detection of these arms transfers and to obtain clearance for the flights, a sophisticated trail of double documentation was set up. Officially, the arms were sent to Nigeria and flight authorizations and matching cargo manifests were issued for the cargo aircraft to fly to Lagos. At the same time, flight requests were issued for the same aircraft to fly to Liberia but then the specification on the cargo manifests stated that the arms on board were “mine drilling equipment” for a diamond mine in Monrovia. 6. The present report shows in detail how the arms were delivered and how false documentation was used. The Panel obtained false end-user certificates from Nigeria, used for the delivery of over 200 tons of arms in violation of the arms embargo. In cooperation with the Nigerian authorities, it was established that the end-user certificates were false. A non-existent Nigerian company and a number of go-between companies and brokers were involved in these illicit arms deals. 7. The Panel observed that arms also continue to reach LURD rebels through the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire or Guinea. In one case described in the present report, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was found to have mortar rounds that originally had been supplied by the United Arab Emirates to the Republic of Guinea as military assistance. According to the Guinean Defence Ministry, these arms were destroyed during a fire in one of the Guinean armed forces military barracks. 8. The Panel recommends that: • The arms embargo on Liberia should continue and be regularly monitored for violations. 7 S/2002/1115 • The arms embargo should be extended to all armed non-State actors in the region, including LURD. Arms-exporting countries should abstain from supplying arms to the Mano River Union countries, in line with the moratorium on small arms that applies for the whole ECOWAS region. • The urgent establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for a standardized end-user certificate that would contain, at the minimum, the name, address and telephone number of the signing authority for the certificate, and the name, address, telephone number and arms-trading licence of the broker(s) involved. • The moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa and its implementation mechanism, the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), should be more effectively used to monitor and combat illicit trafficking and sanctions busting. 9. Under the current requirements for the moratorium, the member States of ECOWAS issue requests for exemptions to import arms to the ECOWAS secretariat, which are then circulated to the member States for approval. There is, however, no requirement to submit copies of the end-user certificates that are issued to order the arms in the case that the exemption is granted. The Panel also recommends that: • All end-user certificates should be submitted to the ECOWAS secretariat as part of the procedure to obtain waivers for the importation of arms into West Africa. • The moratorium should be broadened and become an information exchange mechanism for all types of weapons procured by ECOWAS members. Civil aviation 10. Although Liberia has changed its former EL prefix to A8, Liberia has not registered any aircraft on its newly opened registry. This could result in aircraft still operating under the old prefix. The Panel believes the Liberian civil aviation authorities should act quickly to ensure that this change is instituted. 11. The Panel continued to try to obtain information from the Liberian authorities about the crash of an Antonov 12 cargo plane at Roberts International Airport on 15 February 2002. Little further information was forthcoming, and a copy of the accident notification drawn up for ICAO by the authorities was substandard and inaccurate. Investigations by the Panel confirm that the crew was Ukrainian, and the flight was carrying tightly packed rectangular wooden boxes. The boxes were covered with Chadian diplomatic seals, and the impact of the crash caused their contents to explode. The navigator of the plane was killed and was buried in Odessa. 12. The Panel recommends that Liberia, in accordance with the requirements set by the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, investigate properly the aircraft accident and that its findings — including those on the nature of the cargo — be presented to the Security Council Committee on Liberia within three months. Diamonds 13. The embargo, coupled with progress in the Sierra Leone peace process, has continued to result in the disappearance of “Liberian”-labelled rough diamonds from official markets. Smuggling of Liberian diamonds into neighbouring States has also 8 S/2002/1115 declined because quality production has been disrupted by the internal conflict in Lofa. 14. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for trade in rough diamonds will be launched on 5 November 2002, and both Guinea and Sierra Leone report that their certification schemes work well, although smuggling remains a serious problem. Liberia has yet to make progress in establishing a credible certification system. 15. A draft plan of action for Liberia drawn up by the High Diamond Council (HRD) for the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy is a small step forward. It makes suggestions on what would be the minimum requirements needed for Liberia to be compatible with the Kimberley Process. Liberia is far from this currently and will need to show political will and obtain international assistance if it is to join the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Revenue and governmental expenditure 16. The Panel continued to investigate how the Government of Liberia funds its arms procurement. Nearly all income appears to be used for military operations and this pattern of spending has contributed towards humanitarian hardship. An independent audit of key revenue sources, such as those from the corporate and maritime registry and timber industry, remains pressing. In both cases, the Panel found evidence of discrepancies of millions of United States dollars between the figures provided by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Liberia or the Forestry Development Authority. 17. In a welcome move, the Government of Liberia signed on 27 September with the international auditing firm Deloitte & Touche for a systems audit and design aimed at capturing and tracking the revenue and expenditure of proceeds derived from maritime and forestry activities. This will only last for 120 days, however. The Panel recommends that the Government publish all of the results of this systems audit and that, once it is completed, it should be followed up with an 18-month full financial audit by an international auditing firm. The travel ban 18. The Panel believes that the travel ban continues to be violated and has continued to receive reports of individuals named on the list being sighted in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. As reported in previous reports, sightings of Liberian officials at Abidjan airport have continued and the local authorities appear to be relaxed about enforcing the ban. Conclusions on the humanitarian impact of sanctions 19. Sanctions have had a negligible impact on the humanitarian situation and the diamond ban is confined to a traditionally small sector of the economy that has been more affected by insecurity in Lofa than by sanctions. Lifting the arms embargo without adequate reform of the security sector would leave the civilian population even more at the mercy of unconstitutional forces, armed militia and abusive security apparatus. Reform requires a restructuring of the armed forces in Liberia to reconstitute an appropriate command and control structure and to ensure discipline and the rule of law. 9 S/2002/1115 20. The travel ban is targeted at a small number of individuals and has not affected the wider population, although it continues to provide savings for government. Poor governance, economic mismanagement and armed conflict are the prime reasons for the lack of investor confidence and donor fatigue, not sanctions, although the latter do enhance the image of Liberia as an international pariah. 21. Sanctions have had a psychological impact on the population. Speculators in the currency market exploited the imposition of sanctions, resulting in a rise in inflation and higher prices for goods. Rent seekers have also raised prices and attributed these to sanctions, even when that is not the case. 22. The Government of Liberia has also used the imposition of sanctions as an excuse for its failure to improve services and reform. The Government has conducted an effective propaganda campaign across the country and many Liberians believe that their marginalization and some of their economic woes are owing in part to United Nations sanctions. The United Nations has done little to counter such negative propaganda. Introduction A. General 23. In reference to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002) of 6 May 2002, the Secretary-General, on 17 July 2002, appointed a Panel of Experts (see annex I) to conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, in order to investigate and compile a report on: • The Government of Liberia’s compliance with the demands contained in subparagraphs 2 (a) to (d) of Council resolution 1343 (2001); • The potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001); • Any violations of those measures, including any that involve rebel movements. 24. In paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001), the Council demands that the Government of Liberia immediately cease its support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region, and in particular take the concrete steps delineated under subparagraphs (a) to (d), which include: (a) Expel all RUF members from Liberia and prohibit all RUF activities on its territory; (b) Cease all financial and military support to RUF and take steps to ensure that no such support is provided from the territory of Liberia or by its nationals; (c) Cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leonean rough diamonds which are not controlled through the certificate of origin regime of the Government of Sierra Leone; (d) Freeze funds or financial resources or assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by RUF. 10 S/2002/1115 25. Paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) involve, respectively, a tightened embargo on arms and related materiel of all types, including technical training; a ban on the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia; and a travel ban on senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces, their spouses and individuals providing armed support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia. 26. Throughout its work, the Panel remained cognizant of the fact that the demands contained in subparagraphs 2 (a) to (d) of resolution 1343 (2001) were intended to lead to consolidation of the peace process in Sierra Leone and to further progress in the peace process in the Mano River Union. 27. The Panel took particular note of paragraph 4 of resolution 1408 (2002), in which the Council calls on all States in the region to cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, to take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and to refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 28. On 15 July 2002, the Liberian Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Liberia to the United Nations a decision, CM/Dec.662 (LXXVI), on the situation in Liberia taken by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (now known as the African Union) at its seventysixth ordinary session, held in Durban, South Africa. In the decision, the Council calls on all States in the region to cease support for armed groups from neighbouring countries and prevent armed groups from using their territories to prepare and stage attacks on neighbouring countries. It also calls on the Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed by it on Liberia, in the light of what the African Union described as the “grave socio-economic impact on the populace”. 29. The Panel also took note of the contents of the written submission made to it by the Government of Liberia on 13 August 2002 during its meeting with the Government’s task force on compliance with sanctions. The written submission encloses an assessment report on the military situation prepared by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the correspondences undertaken by the Government of Liberia to get help and assistance in establishing a certificate of origin regime for diamonds. The Panel has taken all of these submissions into account in the preparation of the present report. 30. The Panel of Experts consisted of an expert from ICAO, Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal); an expert on arms and their transportation, Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium); an expert with Interpol investigative experience, Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India); and an expert on diamonds, Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The letter of appointment of the Panel is contained in annex I. 31. The Panel first met at United Nations Headquarters on 30 July 2002, and it was agreed with the Security Council Committee on Liberia that its report would be submitted on 7 October 2002. The Panel also kept the Security Council Committee on Liberia informed of the progress of its work, as and when necessary. 11 S/2002/1115 B. Methodology of the investigation 32. Questionnaires. The Panel requested specific information from the relevant countries, through their permanent missions to the United Nations, regarding certain arms shipments, the movement of suspicious aircraft used for the illegal transportation of arms and ammunition, and the activities of certain individuals involved in such deals. The Panel requested information from 38 countries. Most of the information requested was provided by the concerned Governments. Four exceptions stand out: despite reminders, no response was received from Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. 33. Visits to countries. The Panel travelled extensively to the countries involved, or believed to be involved, in the trafficking of weapons and related materiel to Liberia in violation of Security Council embargoes and also to those countries that could provide useful information on such activities. The entire Panel visited Belgium, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the United States of America. One or more members of the Panel visited the Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Ghana, Lebanon, Moldova, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia. 34. Field visits. In order to make a first-hand assessment of the potential humanitarian and economic impact of the sanctions on the Liberian population, a consultant to the Panel 1 travelled extensively in the interior areas of Liberia. This included visits to the camps of internally displaced persons,2 refugee camps,3 hospitals,4 diamond mining claim sites, logging concession sites, saw mills and plywood factories, reforestation sites, rice plantation, rubber plantations and farming areas. 35. Interviews. In each country visited, the Panel members interviewed governmental authorities and, where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists. The Panel also contacted a number of key individuals whose names have been a subject of interest and controversy in recent months in connection with the crisis in the subregion (see annex II). Given, however, the sensitive nature of the subjects investigated by the Panel, it should be noted that many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several meetings held in various countries have therefore not been listed. 36. Assistance from international and regional organizations. The Panel received useful cooperation and assistance from several international organizations such as IMF, Interpol, ICAO, IMO, and made proper use of their expertise, where relevant. 37. Police and judicial records. The Panel was able to access the police and judicial records of several cases linked to trafficking of arms and ammunition that were under investigation and under-trial. C. Standards of verification 38. The Panel used the same high evidentiary standards in its investigations as used in its previous reports (S/2001/1015 and S/2002/470). This required at least two credible and independent sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also put allegations to those concerned so as to allow 12 S/2002/1115 them the right of reply. As in its previous reports, the Panel attached a large number of annexes, comprising documents proving the ownership of airline companies, payments made for arms purchases and fraudulent use of passports to bypass travel ban restrictions etc. 39. In the past two years, the Panel has systematically collected from West African countries the statistics and details on the movement of unscheduled flights to and from Liberia. Depending on the recorded departure point of the flights, the Panel has also gathered information from several other African countries, all over the continent, and from several States in Europe and the Middle East on the routings and flight plans of the aircraft involved. 40. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel received corroborating information from international agencies and police sources operating at the international as well as national level. The assistance of Interpol specialists was also called upon as and when required. In all cases mentioned in the report that follows, the Panel did not rely solely on oral testimonies. Corroborative documentary and circumstantial evidence was always insisted upon. The evidence, therefore, is incontrovertible and irrefutable. D. Mandate of the Panel: the dilemma continues 41. The Panel’s mandate is described in section A above. In its earlier report (S/2002/470), the Panel had mentioned the concern raised by the Government of Liberia and some of its supporters about the reasonableness of the sanctions against Liberia in pursuance of paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) in the light of RUF having been fully transformed into a political party. The same concern was repeatedly raised during the current mandate. The Panel remained cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of the subregion. E. De-linking subparagraphs 2 (a) to (d) from paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) 42. The Panel was repeatedly reminded by the Government of Liberia that the sanctions imposed under paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) were a direct result of the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), in which the Panel had concluded that the Government of Liberia was actively aiding and abetting conflict in Sierra Leone by providing military and financial support to RUF. In January 2001, when the President of Sierra Leone declared the end of war in Sierra Leone by the symbolic gesture of shaking hands with General Issa Sessay of RUF, it also marked, at least in principle, the completion of the metamorphosis of RUF into a political party known as the RUF Party (RUFP). 43. It is a strange situation: on the one hand, the Government of Liberia claims that the provisions of subparagraphs 2 (a) to (d) have become redundant and, on the other hand, it continues to violate the sanctions imposed under paragraphs 5 and 7. These violations have been brought out clearly in two previous reports (S/2001/1015 and S/2002/470) and also in the present report. 13 S/2002/1115 Part One The context Liberia’s internal conflict and regional instability 44. The internal conflict in the north-west of the country spread towards towns and villages closer to the capital Monrovia in the months prior to the Panel’s new assessment mission. Early in August, the Panel visited Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia and found that a direct threat to the Liberian capital no longer existed after the Government forces and militia started a series of counter-offensives around the end of June, driving LURD out of such cities as Tubmanburg. These were clearly assisted by the significant deliveries of arms and ammunition from Yugoslavia that arrived at Roberts International Airport in June, July and August from Belgrade (see part Two below). 45. The August shipment also included a new rotor engine and spare blades for one of the Government’s military helicopters. Quickly repaired after months of inactivity owing to a lack of spare parts, this helicopter was used immediately to resupply overstretched bases closer to the front line in the north. 46. Likewise, the offensives of the different LURD factions have coincided with new supplies of arms and ammunition. LURD strongholds and positions can only be resupplied by road from neighbouring Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and possibly Sierra Leone. LURD operations in the first six months of 2002 suggest some training, supply of new arms and overall command and control. 47. The military situation, however, remains very unclear and contradicting claims of victories and losses by either side are very difficult to verify. Lofa is largely inaccessible and the conflict has spread to areas closer to the capital that have become inaccessible for independent observers or humanitarian agencies. In upper Lofa, both LURD and government armed forces and militia operate on an axis between Zorzor, Vahun, Kolahun and Voinjama. Individual fighters from both warring sides regularly cross into the porous border zones along the Sierra Leonean or Guinean borders. Growing humanitarian crisis Liberia is today once more facing a humanitarian crisis. The fighting in the north-west has led to the multiple internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of Liberians in addition to the exodus of nearly 200,000 into neighbouring countries. According to the World Food Programme, only 35,000 internally displaced beneficiaries were receiving food in February 2002 and that had increased to over 127,000 by September 2002. Thousands more internally displaced are thought to have been trapped behind the front lines of the fighting without adequate food security. Since the fighting is continuing and many displaced persons are inaccessible, the number of internally displaced persons is expected to significantly rise over the coming year. 14 S/2002/1115 48. In Sierra Leone, the Panel obtained reports about small groups of hungry and demoralized Liberian government soldiers or LURD rebels fleeing into border villages, sometimes for purposes of looting and extortion. Abductions of civilians in eastern Sierra Leone by unidentified men have also been reported — a reminder of how fragile peace still is in this region. 49. The Panel once again received credible information about LURD members stationed in Guinean border towns. The Panel met early in 2002 with LURD representatives in the Guinean capital. 50. This illustrates how volatile this region is. The outbreak of violence in Côte d’Ivoire only adds to this instability and will contribute to the continued proliferation of bandits, rebel groups, mercenaries, uncontrolled police and militia in the entire subregion. The Panel received numerous accounts of groups of mercenaries from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana and Burkina Faso offering their services to the various warring groups in the Mano River Union area. Along with these armed men, weapons and ammunition continue to move across borders. A. Remnants of the Revolutionary United Front are still active in Liberia 51. One such armed group comprises the remnants of the armed RUF in Liberia. The Panel recognized the importance of paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001), subparagraphs (a) to (d), which includes a call for the expulsion of all RUF members from Liberia and the cessation of all financial support of RUF. The Panel reported (see S/2002/470) that remnants of the now defunct RUF in Sierra Leone have joined, as mercenaries, the various warring factions in Liberia. Reports of hundreds of RUF forming the core of some of the offensive units on the side of the Government of Liberia are persistent. 52. Interviewed by the Panel in a country in the subregion, a key former member of RUF, Ibrahim Balde (also known as Bah), told the Panel that the hardcore elements of RUF, mostly Sierra Leoneans, had been integrated in the Anti-Terrorist Unit in Liberia. Their current commander is General Benjamin Yeaten, a close confident of President Taylor. It is said that the Unit’s continued loyalty to Sam Bockarie is the latter’s guarantee to continued Liberian patronage. Bockarie is, however, not thought to be staying in Liberia. The Panel, after repeated attempts, was finally given permission by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to talk to the wife of Sam Bockarie. She is living in Paynesville, a suburb of Monrovia, in a compound with her four children and some other relatives. She told the Panel members that she had not heard from her husband for at least six months. Two sources, one of them Ibrahim Balde, told the Panel that Sam Bockarie had first been relocated to Zambia after his departure from Monrovia and that he had last been seen in Ghana, as reported earlier by the Panel (see S/2002/470). 53. Citizens and diplomats in Monrovia still regard the area where the Panel met Sam Bockarie’s wife as a RUF stronghold and are frightened to go there. Balde and another informed source in Monrovia estimated current RUF strength in Liberia at between 1,250 and 1,500 men. 54. These men represent the last coherent surviving structure of the armed RUF and they are maintained by the Liberian Government and continue to play an important part in Liberia’s military capability. 15 S/2002/1115 B. Fears of the civilian population 55. Liberian citizens live in a constant state of fear, not only because of the LURD insurgency but also because of fear of forced recruitment, maltreatment, looting, extortion or other abuses by the undisciplined armed units deployed by the Government, including the former RUF units. The regular armed forces, the various militia and the groups of fighters have not received salaries for months, a situation that encourages them to fight each other or to loot, steal or even kill innocent civilians. Although cases of torture and maltreatment of civilians by the various factions of LURD have also been documented, the population fears the Government controlled forces even more. 56. On 8 February 2002, a state of emergency was declared. The Foreign Minister and National Security Adviser claimed it was imposed in order to permit the Government to use its resources, without constraint for security measures. This had a serious impact on the ability of the political opposition, civil society, the United Nations and other actors to engage effectively the Liberian Government in a peace process and has increased the practices of intimidation, violence and human rights abuses even further. The lifting of the state of emergency at the end of September 2002 creates a window to address these issues. 57. There is also strong evidence that some of the looting campaigns have been stage-managed by the Government and then later blamed on the dissidents in an effort to make a case against t